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Abstract: 
Since 2004, investigations and debates have been carried out on the French research and 
innovation system. Policy-makers have tried to break with the traditional ‘colbertist’ state-
centered model, which put emphasis on interventionism and state involvement. This system 
that  was  successful  until  the  80ies,  seems  unfit  to  the  increasingly  competitive  and 
knowledge-driven  economy.  The  French  model  is  also  challenged  by  the  changes  in  the 
policy context, as new actors such as regions, and constraints such as the Lisbon agenda are 
framing policy-making and implementation in the arena of research and innovation policies.  
The new Law for research aims at reforming the organisation of the research and innovation 
system,  mostly  by  creating  new  structures,  at  the  governance  level,  such  as  the  National 
Research Agency (ANR), and at the research and innovation production level, such as the 
Competitiveness Clusters. 
The aim of this paper is to provide a case study that illustrates empirically the challenges of 
the setting up of these two new structures, and their difficulties to combine their actions. This 
qualitative  research  highlights  the  need  for  coordination  and  communication  to  reduce 
uncertainties and redundancies. Our work illustrates that the new organisation of the research 
and innovation system consists of creating more and more structures, without thinking in 
terms of policy-mix. A policy-mix perspective, that is to say a combination and balance of the 
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Introduction 
Since 2004, investigations and debates have been carried out on the French research and 
innovation system. Policy-makers have tried to break with the traditional ‘colbertist’ state-
centered model, which put emphasis on interventionism and state involvement. This system 
that  was  successful  until  the  80ies,  seems  unfit  to  the  increasingly  competitive  and 
knowledge-driven  economy.  The  French  model  is  also  challenged  by  the  changes  in  the 
policy context, as new actors such as regions, and constraints such as the Lisbon agenda are 
framing policy-making and implementation in the arena of research and innovation policies. 
In  2004,  the  French  innovation  system  experienced  a  deep  identity  crisis.  The  critics 
denounced the poor performance of the highly specific French innovation system, which lacks 
strategic vision and monitoring. 
 
This crisis forced the government to propose a new Law for Research and Innovation that 
aims to set up a new organisation of the research and innovation system. The creation of new 
funding  agencies,  the  National  Research  Agency  (ANR)  and  the  Agency  for  Industrial 
Innovation modify the landscape of the state governance of research and innovation.  
At the level of the research and innovation production, the creation of new structures such as 
the Carnot Institutes, the Thematic Advanced Research Networks
3 or the Competitiveness 
Clusters
4, contributes to structure the organization of the actors of public and private research 
by  supporting  the  emergence  of  hybrid  networks.  The  State  governance  is  supposed  to 
concentrate financial means on them.  
One year after their setting-up, the objectives and procedures of these new devices are always 
subjects to evolutions. Since then, actors have to deal with the complexity of the system, 
enhanced by the problematic interfaces between new instruments.  
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These changes echo with the recent academic debates that focus on developing more efficient 
innovation policies, and among them, analysis in term of innovation policy-mix.  A policy-
mix perspective attempts to combine and balance various policy instruments that are used in 
complementary and mutually reinforcing ways to achieve desired objectives. Thus, a policy 
mix perspective grants less emphasis on the design and evaluation of individual instruments 
of  innovation  policy  and  focuses  more  on  questions  such  as  completeness,  balance  and 
interactions between policy instruments (OECD, 2005).  Therefore, examining the innovation 
policies requires not only to analyse the instruments individually, but also to analyse the way 
they interact. 
 
In order to contribute to the understanding of the challenges of the French policy-mix, this 
paper  describes  two  policy  tools,  the  National  Research  Agency  (ANR)  and  the 
Competitiveness Clusters, and their mutual interactions. As we achieved two reports, the first 
one studying the ANR setting up, and the second one concerning the ANR’s actions towards 
the Competitiveness Clusters, it gave us the opportunity to observe both instruments. 
In that purpose, we conducted two series of interviews. We began to interview actors of the 
French innovation system during the first 2005 semester to get their perception of the newly 
created  ANR.  Then,  we  interviewed  sixteen  actors  of  Competitiveness  cluster  and  six 
managers of the ANR, between August and October 2006, in order to apprehend the relations 
between the two structures one year after their creation. 
The aim of this paper is to provide a case study, illustrating empirically the challenges of the 
interactions between the ANR and the Clusters. This paper is structured in three sections. First 
section gives some insights about the French National System. In particular, we focus on the 
description  of  the  current  evolution  of  the  system  and  give  some  interpretations  of  this 
evolution. The second section deals with the detailed analysis of each individual instrument,   5 
its purpose and objectives in the changing system. The third section pays attention to the 
challenges of combining them. 
1. Rationales for a new law on research and innovation 
The French national system of innovation is traditionally considered as being dominated by a 
centralised,  colbertist  State  (Chesnais,  1993).  This  model  can  be  defined  by  four  main 
characteristics  (Laredo  and  Mustar,  2002).  First  of  all,  the  majority  of  the  French  public 
research budget was dedicated to large programs, such as defence sector. Secondly, unlike 
most  foreign  countries,  basic  research  is  not  accomplished  in  universities.  A  special 
institution, the National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS) handles most of the basic 
research.  Thirdly,  France  is  characterised  by  a  multiplication  of  the  number  of  mission-
oriented public research institutes. Finally, public support for industrial research is controlled 
by a number of large high-tech companies. 
Laredo and Mustar (2002) show that the system has evolved in the 1990s, as the almost 
disappearance  of  the  large  programs  or  the  stronger  connexion  between  applied  and 
fundamental  research  in  the  public  sector  can  prove.  However,  these  changes  are  not 
sufficiently efficient to face the complex modes of knowledge production and the increase of 
the interactions between science and industry (OECD, 2005). There might be a failure on the 
system coherence (Barré, 2006). In the 2000s, several events have then lead to re-think the 
French innovation system or at least to modify this organisation. As a result, a new law called 
“Pact for Research” and voted in April 2006, targets to reform the governance modes of the 
French system.   6 
1.1. The forces for change 
During  of  the  European  Council  of  Lisbon  in  March  2000,  the  Heads  of  States  and  of 
governments have adhered to an ambitious common objective: to make European Union "the 
most  competitive  and  dynamic  knowledge-based  economy  in  the  world".  One  of  the 
objectives is to devote by 2010, 3% of the GDP to R&D. This echoes with Caracostas & 
Muldur (2001) statement, which highlight that European R&D investments are insufficient 
and their allocation inefficient.  Therefore, Lisbon agenda highlights the need to evaluate the 
performance of the national innovation system in a global economy. At the European level, 
one of the outcomes would be the building of the European research space (cf. Laredo, 2003 
for a description) 
In 2004, the European Commission has evaluated the progress made to achieve the Lisbon 
agenda. It has thus urged the governments to give a new impulse to the Lisbon strategy. In 
particular, it has distinguished two actions. On the one hand, investment in networks and 
knowledge, for instance, the launching of priority projects approved in the European initiative 
for growth should be a priority. On the other hand, member countries should reinforce their 
competitiveness in industry and services, in particular in the fields of industrial policy, market 
for services and environmental technologies. Thus, knowledge, network and competitiveness 
are the main issues for economic growth.  
Along with the increasing importance of the European Union, regional authorities develop 
their sphere of competencies in strategy and financing in R&D and innovation. They develop 
joint  policies  with  the  government  but  they  also  decide  to  have  their  own  actions  in 
emergence scientific domains. For instance, in 2005 the Paris Region (Ile de France) launched 
a strategic plan, and identified some scientific and technological priorities, so-called “domains 
d’intérêt majeur”, upon which they will focus their financial aids. The Region also raised its 
R&D budget up to 5% of its total budget.   7 
Coincidently, in 2004, different facts claim for new actions in the French innovation policy. 
Several public reports, such as Beffa (2005), Blanc (2004) highlighted the decline of the 
French industrial competitiveness, in particular in high value-added sectors. In contrast, these 
reports emphasized the importance of re-thinking industrial policy, by encompassing more 
innovation and competitiveness focus. Besides, some events had a kind of snowball effect in 
the debate. For instance, the Shangai ranking, which showed the decline of French research 
and education system attractiveness, made a fuss in the public opinion. 
Moreover, in spite of the Lisbon Agenda and of the recognized importance of research in the 
economic system and its role in the competitiveness of a country, the French government 
reduced the research budgets in 2003. This event led many researchers to mobilize to propose 
a reform of the French research system. 
1.2.  Towards  a  new  governance  of  research  and  innovation 
policies? 
As a consequence of these facts, the government decided to propose a new law, which should 
enact  a  new  pact  between  the  State  and  the  civil  society,  in  particular  the  researchers’ 
community.  The  “Law  for  Research”  project  should  reconcile  the  need  for  a  higher 
performance and stakeholders’ interests. It states the following objectives and measures. 
 
   8 
Table 1: Objectives and measures presented in the Pact for research 
Objectives  Measures 
Enforcing  the  capabilities  for  strategic 
orientation and for priorities setting 
High Council for Science and Technology 
Interministerial  Committee  for  Scientific 
and Technological Research 
National Research Agency 
Agency for Industrial Innovation 
Building  a  unified,  coherent  and  transparent 
system for research evaluation 
Agency for Research Evaluation 
Clustering energies and facilitating cooperation 
betweens actors in Research 
Research and Higher Education Clusters 
Research Campus 
Calls  for  proposals  launched  by  the 
National Research Agency  
Making  scientific  carriers  more  attractive  and 
evolving 
Descartes Sponsorships 
Intensifying  the  innovation  dynamics  and 
improving linkages between Public and Private 
Research 
Aids  for  the  development  of  Innovative 
Start Ups 
Increase  the  financial  aids  for  SME’s 
research 
Large Technological Programs funded by 
the Agency for Industrial Innovation 
Carnot  Institutes  (“Franhofer  Institutes” 
like) 
Collaborative  research  project  funded  by 
the National Research Agency 
Competitiveness Clusters 
Enforcing  integration  of  the  French  System  in 
the European Research Area 
Researchers mobility 
Increase  the  proportion  of  evaluation 
achieved by international experts 
Increase  the  proportion  of  THE  ANR’s 
funding  devoted  to  European  calls  for 
projects 
 
As  this  table  summarises,  most  objectives  have  been  turned  into  the  creation  of  new 
structures. For instance, we see that various strategic councils and agencies such as Agency 
for Industrial Innovation, the National Research Agency were created to improve strategic 
planning and monitoring capabilities. OECD (2005) argues that this flourishing of agencies 
and  fragmentation  is  a  consequence  of  the  increasing  influence  of  the  New  Public 
Management thought. This system of thought influenced policy-makers since the 80ies asserts 
the need for public accountability (Bach, 2006). It led to the creation of independent agencies,   9 
since they avoid risks of corruption and allow rationalization of public management. This 
increase  in  fragmentation  may  however  deteriorate  the  transversal  coordination  if  the 
efficiency of each instrument is prevailing over global long-term strategy. 
 
Some measures such as the creation of the Réseaux Thématiques de Recherche Avancée
5 and 
the Competitiveness Clusters, targets the emergence of multiple hybrid networks of research 
and innovation producers. This fact also expresses “a shift from state regulation of economic 
affairs to a degree of self-regulation by responsible groups in economy and society” (Cooke, 
2001),  sometimes  depicted  as  associative  governance.  However,  our  observations  tend  to 
relativize the significance of this trend. In particular, in the case of Competitiveness Clusters, 
we will show here after that the local structures of governance lack recognition from the State 
level of governance.  
 
These various measures also target a stronger competitiveness of the French research and 
innovation  system,  since  it  gives  more  importance  to  project-based  financing.  With  the 
Agency for Industrial Innovation, ANR and Competitiveness Clusters, financing is oriented 
towards competitive projects, fitting in the national priorities. 
 
The Pact for Research expresses a clear political consciousness that innovation policy is a 
priority.  There  is  in  addition  a  strong  political  willingness  for  change  towards  more 
performance. The Pact for Research expresses strengthening linkages between fundamental 
research and innovation. Nevertheless, OECD (2005) advises policy makers to think about the 
tensions within the system. Otherwise the policy instruments cannot be coherently combined 
for  developing  innovation  capabilities.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  innovation  policy-mix  should 
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combine instruments depending on the Ministry of Research and Higher Education and the 
Ministry  of  Industry.  Historically  there  have  been  some  tensions  between  these  two 
ministries, which impact the efficiency of the policy design.  
 
To further the interpretation of this evolution in the system, we propose to look closer at the 
effective  functioning  of  two  structures:  Competitiveness  Clusters  and  National  Research 
Agency. This will lead us in section 3 to examine if these different levels of governance 
cooperate and combine their action for the reach of their objectives.  
2. Two new structures in the French Innovation system : 
the Competitiveness Clusters and the National Research 
Agency 
2.1. Competitiveness Clusters as multi-purpose instruments 
As the Ministry of Industry defines them, Competitiveness Clusters encompass various forms 
of partnerships. To reinforce territories' attractiveness, they gather on a territorial scale, public 
research units, training centres and enterprises on projects whether on emerging themes or on 
more mature themes.  
Since their launch, Competitiveness Clusters have gained more and more importance on the 
political  agenda,  so  far  as  to  encompass  many  objectives  wider  than  innovation  and 
technology.  
2.1.1. Chronology and context  
This project was established in September 2004, following two reports. Blanc (2004) states 
that in order to maintain its competitiveness, France has to promote a regional-based cluster 
policy. Such a policy will support the competitiveness of territories in which companies are 
settled  as  an  indirect  mean  to  promote  their  own  competitiveness  (Delemarle  &  Larédo,   11 
2006). Cluster policy will increase synergies between heterogeneous actors, namely public 
research institutions, industries and local institutions. In particular, Blanc points out that in 
France, some territories, for example Saclay, in Paris region, do not enhance their potential 
strengths due to the lack of willingness and mobilising leaders. 
The  DATAR,  the  French  mission-oriented  agency  dedicated  to  territorial  development, 
reviews the weight of the industrial  sector in the economic potential of the country. The 
impact analysis of the localized production system, promoted in the 1990’s by the DATAR, 
showed that these networks suffer from the absence of research actors, although they can 
clearly help to catalyse cooperation in the field of innovation (Ginsbourger and al., 2006). In 
this new report, DATAR proposes that France should shift its industrial policy tools towards a 
better  combination  of  industry  and  innovation,  through  the  emergence  and  support  of 
Competitiveness Clusters. 
 
In this context, a inter-ministerial committee decided to implement structures to reinforce 
innovation  particularly  in  relation  to  research  units.  A  call  for  proposal  was  launched  in 
November 2004 to select Clusters projects. Four aspects were taken into consideration :  
•  The economic development strategy must enshrine the Cluster in the local economic 
network, in order to be inserted in the international competition.  
•  The Cluster must be visible from an international point of view and concern industrial 
and technological aspects.  
•  The  partnership  and  the  governance  model  that  will  be  implemented  are  of  core 
importance. The quality of R&D partnerships is a major criteria of the selection of the 
Clusters.  
•  Projects that will be accepted must create synergies as regards R&D, and therefore 
provide new added value.   12 
Originally, only 10 to 15 Clusters projects were expected. Yet, 105 projects applications were 
proposed  to  the  selection  committee,  which  can  be  explained  by  two  facts.  First,  as  we 
mentioned  previously,  the  local  networks  that  were  existing  on  the  French  territory 
constituted  the  basis  for  numerous  Clusters  projects.  Second,  territorial  authorities,  in 
particular  regions  but  also  departments  and  local  councils,  were  deeply  involved  in  the 
process, which mobilising actors and supporting their efforts (Delemarle & Laredo, 2006). As 
a consequence, the government selected 67 proposals, distinguishing 15 world-class Clusters 
and 52 Clusters of national scope. To finance these numerous Clusters, the initial State budget 
of € 750 m was doubled to reach €1,5 bn over a three-year period, distributed among several 
state  agencies  (Agency  for  Industrial  Innovation,  National  Research  Agency,  Fund  for 
Enterprise Competitiveness, Oseo-Innovation). These fundings are mainly managed by the 
Ministry of Industry. But above all, territorial authorities are expected to fund the Clusters as 
much as the State does. 
Since  their  accreditation,  the  Clusters  have  been  working  on  settling  their  governance 
structures and the procedures for the general functioning. At this point, it is important to 
highlight that the official discourse concerning the Clusters governance initially asserted the 
need for self-organisation. The government insists on the fact that economic actors have to 
decide for themselves. 
2.1.2. An illustrative example: Cap Digital Paris Region cluster 
In order to give some insights of the purposes and the challenges of Competitiveness Clusters, 
we would like to present one of them, namely Cap Digital. Although we observe that each 
cluster  has  its  specificities,  describing  this  world-class  cluster  can  provide  a  general 
framework for understanding the French cluster initiative.   13 
Figure 1: Cap Digital's application themes (source: capdigital.com) 
 
Paris  Region  concentrates  half  of  the  research  and  innovation  capabilities  in  multimedia 
technologies  (video  games,  image  and  sound,  ICT).  Some  local  business  networks  and 
emerging  spaces  for  collective  actions  existed  before  the  cluster  initiative,  these  are 
professional  associations  (Film  Producers  Association),  local  production  systems  (Capital 
Games,  Silicon  Sentier)  accredited  by  the  DATAR,  several  high  tech  incubators  and 
technological platforms. When the call for proposals was launched, local authorities promoted 
two different projects. In order to reach a critical mass and because these two projects were 
rather closely related in terms of technologies, the two projects were combined to form a 
unique Competitiveness cluster for Digital Content and Knowledge Creation industry.  
On  12
th  July  2005,  the  interministerial  committee  for  regional  planning  and  development 
accredited the cluster project finally entitled Cap Digital. Its activities revolve around the 
multimedia,  knowledge  and  cultural  industries  to  encourage  cross-disciplinary  innovation 
around 6 digital application themes: Video games, Audio-visual and new media, Knowledge   14 
engineering, Digital heritage, Education, Digital lifestyle and Services. The underlying vision 
is  that  these  different  themes  share  common  challenges  and  needs,  the  main  being  the 
technological and usage convergence. 
The cluster has the distinctive feature to comprise the most SMEs. More than 200 SMEs are 
members of the cluster association, plus around 80 potential ‘indirect members’ that is to say 
the members of the enterprises associations that are themselves members of the cluster. To 
which are added some MNCs, e.g. Thales, Thomson, France Telecom, Motorola, research 
institutions  (universities  and  research  labs),  as  well  as  territorial  authorities  (Paris  City, 
Regional Council, etc.). Furthermore, territorial authorities such as the department Val de 
Marne, which were originally not expected to take part in the cluster governance, lobbied to 
be well represented in the administration board.  
Although we observe some differences between themes, the multimedia sector, especially in 
Paris  Region,  is familiar  with  research  and  innovation  policy  tools.  In  2004,  40%  of  the 
research projects partners funded in the national multimedia research program were located in 
the  Paris  Region.  In  particular,  the  actors  know  quite  well  the  instruments  dedicated  to 
innovation in SME, mainly provided by OSEO-Innovation. The pre-existing associations have 
also started up various collective actions, from lobbying on the political agenda (for a French 
Small Business Act, or for sectoral aids in video games industry) to research projects, most of 
them funded by local authorities. However, the sector is still not mature. It is fragmented with 
numerous young SMEs. Many actors face financial difficulties. Lastly, the Paris Region has 
been suffering from the global competition with cities like Montreal or London, which attract 
companies and competencies. 
 
The cluster ambition is to promote the development of world-class competitive companies 
within the territory by boosting research innovation and job creation through networking and   15 
collaboration of private, public and investors stakeholders. Therefore, the cluster governance 
activities centre on project management assistance and label accreditation, encouraging the 
exchanges of practices and knowledge among Clusters members
6. Furthermore, their actions 
promote corporate growth through financial and industrial partnerships and lobbying as well 
as expand the internationalisation of members markets through alliances… 
 
From the example of Cap Digital, we learned that Clusters encompass different actors with 
various  expectations.  Territorial  authorities  expect  the  cluster  to  improve  territories 
attractiveness and employment. SME expect Clusters to provide with market opportunities 
and growth. MNCs search for new projects and new potential partners. Academics require 
research questions and also project funding. Consequently, governance structures have to find 
the right balance between individual interest and collective dynamics. 
 
At a general level, we believe that the Clusters’ missions are threefold. First, Clusters work 
for building strategic agenda for their industries and themes. Second, in alignment with these 
strategic visions, Clusters have to identify and promote collaborative projects of different 
nature: some research-oriented, others growth-oriented. Furthermore, Clusters will work for 
the projects realisation and follow-up. Third, Clusters build communities of heterogeneous 
actors.  
 
Concerning their means, most Clusters have two financial resources: the subsidies provided 
by the territorial authorities and the funding agencies; and the membership fees. Aside their 
fees, members boost the cluster dynamics with their time and competencies, which are in 
some  case,  more  costly  than  the  fees  themselves.  Most  Clusters  cannot  fund  project  by 
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themselves, they rely on their different stakeholders that decide to finance the projects or not. 
And the National Research Agency is one of these stakeholders. 
2.2. The ANR: an Agency for funding research projects 
2.2.1. Chronology and context 
The  National  Research  Agency  (ANR)  was  founded  in  February  2005,  on  the  model  of 
foreign funding agencies such as the US National Science Foundation. The rationales for its 
creation were threefold: first to be a visible demonstration of the government’s commitment 
to  science,  second  to  contribute  towards  the  goal  of  investing  3%  of  the  gross  domestic 
product in science by the year 2010, third to make the French research system more visible 
and similar to international standards.  
The Agency mainly operates on the basis of annual calls for proposals. This instrument is 
very common in many countries. Project-based funding aims at stimulating research exploring 
the frontiers of science. This mode of financing is adapted as well to cognitive research as to 
applied research, since the projects are conducted in the public sphere as much as in science-
industry partnership.  
The ANR selects projects mainly on scientific and technical excellence criteria thanks to a 
peer review evaluation. Subsequently, calls for proposal increase the competition between 
research teams. Thus, the agency initiated a shift from a majority recurrent financing to a 
project-based financing, which was widely criticized (Gallié, 2006). Indeed, one of the risks is 
then that researchers orientate their scientific choices to meet the ANR’s programming, at the 
expense of open science and disruptive ideas. The teams that will pass, will be not only the 
best in terms of competences or tools but also the most reactive. Moreover, as it could be 
difficult to evaluate the impact of some research, especially in basic research (Gallié, 2006),   17 
one risk would be to favour only well-known domains of research or short-term projects. To 
avoid some limits of the competitive financing, the government must keep a balance between 
recurrent  funding  and  project  funding.  The  research  cannot  be  considered  as  a  pure 
competitive activity. 
2.2.2. Missions and instruments 
The aim of the creation of the ANR was to provide France with a reactive structure devoted to 
research funding by projects and to assure more transparency in the allocation of financial 
supports. The initial mission of the ANR is then to develop the dynamics of the research 
system and to facilitate its evolution towards a best integration of the national priorities in 
terms of knowledge development, economic activity support and response to the needs for the 
society.  The  ANR  must  bring  more  flexibility,  reactivity  and  as  a  consequence, 
competitiveness in the system. The ANR has then three missions:  
-  To support efforts of basic and applied research in order to produce new knowledge;  
-  To  develop  science-industry  partnership  in  order  to  favour  interactions  and  the 
resulting innovations; 
-  To  facilitate  technology  transfers  of  public  research  in  direction  of  the  economic 
arena. 
 
To carry out its missions, the ANR is addressed simultaneously to public research laboratories 
and firms. The activity of the ANR is based on two main processes : programming and project 
selection.  
When  the  government  defines  its  research  priorities,  the  ANR  builds  the  choice  of  the 
objectives to follow inside each priority (biodiversity maintenance...). Then it elaborates the 
content of every program launched in order to reach theses objectives.    18 
Once the programming is done, calls for proposals represent 80% of its budget, that is to say 
539,2 mo € in 2005.  
Figure 2: the distribution of ANR's financing by type of research  








The ANR distinguishes thematic and “white” (or non-thematic) calls for proposals. The first 
ones represent the national priorities identified by the Government. The second ones support 
knowledge production and scientific progress in every subject. It supports the most original 
and promising research projects. Indeed, scientific and technological ruptures are supposed to 
come mainly from projects, which are not strictly in the national priorities. The logic rests on 
the  recognition  of  excellence  and  the  encouragement  given  to  the  innovative  or 
interdisciplinary steps. Some of the calls for proposals, such as Young researcher programs, 
result from the inheritance of programs led by the Research ministry.  
It must be pointed out that these calls for proposals are qualified of “open” when they only 
concern public researchers. They are named “partnership” when firms are associated to public 
laboratories. 
In addition, the ANR has a set of instruments dedicated to the economic development. They 
are managed by the department "Partnership and Competitiveness" which was created to deal 
with actions oriented towards the support for research achieved by firms, and the knowledge 
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one  of  its  duties  through  additional  funds.  Besides,  this  department  has  developed  and 
managed its own instruments: Carnot Institute, Thematic Advanced Research Network. 
 
The ANR manages a large panel of tools, which can sometimes question the coherence of the 
system. Furthermore, it has to deal with tools that do not fit completely in its initial action. In 
particular, Competitiveness Clusters constitute one of the elements the agency has to deal 
with, to keep in line with the general political willingness, although the agency management 
seems unease with this instrument. 
3. Linking these policy tools for cohesion: stakes and 
challenges 
In the precedent section, we drew attention on each individual structure. The purpose of this 
section is to focus on describing and analysing how these two structures work together and 
combine their actions. By giving more interest to interactions, we keep in line with the idea of 
analysing innovation policy as a system and not only as a bunch of structures and tools. 
3.1.  A  propensity  of  decoupling  though  some  interests  to  work 
together 
Thus, as we showed in table 1, the ANR and the Competitiveness Clusters share the objective 
for intensifying innovation dynamics in the French innovation system. However, it seems 
obvious  that  the  ANR  and  the  Competitiveness  Clusters  have  different  functions  in  the 
system. According to the typology proposed by Rémi Barré (2006), the National Research 
Agency acts for the programming and financing function in the system, while Clusters act for 
producing and using innovation and research capabilities.  
As a consequence of this situation, we observe an asymmetry of information between these 
two levels. In particular, some Clusters reproach the ANR for the lack of transparency and 
intelligibility of the selection process. For instance, some researchers mentioned that they   20 
believed the cluster certification accounts for the project selection process. However, this was 
absolutely  not  the  case.  Even  from  the  ANR’s  managers  view,  they  regret  that  because 
industrial actors do not know its functioning, the ANR is invisible in industrial fields, to the 
advantage of other instruments like OSEO-ANVAR. Reciprocally, the ANR is deficient in 
knowing the Clusters’ procedures. At the time of our interview, one of the managers admitted 
that  apart  from  a  few  emails,  she  never  had  any  formal  information  exchange  with  the 
Clusters’  governance  structure.  Asymmetries  of  information  are  also  testified  by  the 
heterogeneity of mutual knowledge that our interviews revealed. Some Clusters don’t know 
much  about  the  ANR  functioning  while  few  Clusters,  world-class  Clusters,  that  have 
privileged relationships with the ANR, tend to have a clear overview and a better knowledge 
of the processes. If they are not reduced, such lacks of information can discourage firms from 
applying  for  the  ANR’s  projects  and  consequently  restrict  the  firm’s  propensity  to 
collaborative research. 
 
Besides,  the  ANR  and  the  Competitiveness  Clusters  have  different  rationales  for  actions. 
Although the ANR has for mission to promote private-public partnerships, we observed that 
the ANR has a strong propensity to prefer the ‘open science’ mode of knowledge production. 
The scientific excellence as main selection criteria is one example of this propensity. The 
interviewees revealed that “the ANR is a way to assess the project’s scientific excellence”, 
which helps also the cluster in its legitimisation process. At the  same time, some of our 
interviewees said, the ANR main focus is on academic projects and that its action is “oriented 
towards public research”. Therefore, some actors may think they are not concerned by the 
ANR’s financing.. Furthermore, the ANR is a national structure, while Clusters have a strong 
territorial identity. Their embeddedness in the territory is a force for the construction of their 
legitimacy and identity. It weights as well for the funding of their actions, since it appears that   21 
regional and local authorities are important financial contributors. This exposes the difficulty 
of coordination in a multilevel governance.  
 
However,  the  ANR  and  the  Competitiveness  Clusters  have  interests  in  facilitating  the 
interface between them. The ANR is an important actor among the financial stakeholders in 
the Clusters’ system.  
Table 2: The proportion of Clusters' projects in the ANR calls for proposals 
(ANR annual report, 2005) 
Year  Number of the selected 
project that were 
accredited by the 
Clusters 
Total amount for 
the accredited 
projects (millions €) 
Total number of 
projects selected 
by the ANR 
Total budget for the 
calls for proposal 
2005  330  195,9  1454  539,2 
 
In 2005, it was officially displayed that the ANR was the first financial contributor of the 
Clusters  with  a  budget  of  195,9  mo  €.  However,  the  projects  that  got  accredited  by  the 
Clusters in 2005 were not actual ‘Clusters’ projects, if we consider that a cluster project is a 
one that emerged thanks to the Clusters actions. Nevertheless, from the ANR’s point of view, 
Clusters can bring a lot of opportunities and advantages for its activity. Thus Clusters allow to 
enlarge the scope of the calls for proposals by integrating more actors in regions and actors 
that are not usual projects respondents. For instance, a knowledge transfer institution that took 
active part in a cluster, succeeded in the ANR call for proposal.  
 
In order to refine our argument, we examine the different actions of the ANR and the Clusters 
and  their  propensity  for  interacting.  In  that  purpose,  we  distinguish  three  categories  of 
activities, according to the following typology.    22 
First kind of activities, the ‘distinct’ ones are those that clearly have no relationships 
between each other. In that case, there is no need to think about coordination means since the 
ANR  and  the  Competitiveness  Clusters  pursue  different  ends.  The  existence  of  ANR 
instruments devoted to pure academic science, namely the white calls for proposals, asserts 
the  ANR’s  distinct  orientation.  Clusters’  specificity  is  asserted  by  a  set  of  activities  that 
concern only firms, like the human resources projects, in particular education and training 
projects,  or  projects  related  to  growth  and  Competitiveness,  for  instance  investments, 
buildings, intelligence services etc. 
Second kind of activities, complementary activities are those when the actions of the 
ANR and Clusters are related to each other and when coordination can then reinforce each 
other. This category includes the instruments related to R&D projects. We highlight the fact 
that if for the ANR, research projects are the ends, for the Clusters, they are intermediary 
means  to  reach  other  ends.  Yet,  they  have  been  important  milestones  and  indicators  for 
assessing  Clusters  dynamics.  Therefore  projects  are  an  important  part  of  current 
Competitiveness Clusters’ activities. And Clusters’ support and assistance to project proved to 
be efficient when considering the rate of success in the ANR’s calls for proposal. This also 
relates to the programming activities. In the frame of its programming activities, the national 
research agency tries to collect information from the Clusters, about their future projects. As 
one of the main ambition of the Clusters’ governance is to build strategic agenda for the 
technological and scientific community. By their work, Clusters can contribute efficiently to 
the programming. 
Third  kind  of  activities,  overlapping  activities  are  those  that  present  a  risk  of 
redundancy.  Overlapping  instruments  show  the  need  for  better  coordination  and 
communication  between  these  two  structures.  The  label  accreditation  proved  to  be  one 
example of potentially overlapping situations.   23 
3.2.  Overlapping  instruments:  the  case  of  ‘labellisation’ 
accreditation 
With  the  calls  for  proposals,  the  ANR  action  is  not  specifically  oriented  towards  cluster 
projects  (contrary  to  other  financing).  However,  projects,  which  are  accredited  by  the 
governance  structure  of  the  cluster,  can  receive  an  complementary  fund  so  called 
“abondement”. In 2005, the total complementary fund was 6,1 millions euros. In 2005 and 
2006,  complementary  fund  is  given  to  each  partner  of  a  financed  cluster  project  if  he  is 
eligible to the aid. 
 
Since the label accreditation determines the payment of the ANR complementary fund, we 
consider it as an important managerial tool for the Clusters. The label accreditation consists of 
the recognition by the cluster, of projects carried out by local actors and fitting in with its 
strategies. Without the automatic character of the complementary fund, the question of the 
label accreditation would be of no importance. The examination of such a managerial tool for 
cluster is further interesting because it reveals the challenges for a national institution to deal 
with local ‘self-governance’ practices. 
The collection of information at the level of the governance of Competitiveness  Clusters 
confirmed the assumption of a diversity of the possible cases according to Clusters.  
Due to the policy agenda in 2005, the label accreditation was accomplished after the closing 
of the calls for proposal. Consequently, the cluster procedures were not in place yet. In 2006, 
the Clusters structures are progressively setting up the procedures, sometimes after consulting 
the  ANR.  Our  interviews  allowed  us  to  collect  eight  different  procedures  of  label 
accreditation. From these procedures, we identified three models of label accreditation. These 
models offer empirical evidences for understanding the underlying objectives of the label 
accreditation for the Clusters’ governance: 
-  Model 1 : Automatic label accreditation   24 
-  Model 2 : Label accreditation according to the objectives of cluster development 
-  Model 3 : Multicriteria label accreditation 
For each model, after examining its evaluation criteria, we assess its interests and limits. 
Finally, we conclude on the complementary or overlapping character of this model with the 
ANR selection process. 
3.2.1. The automatic label accreditation : simple process but without 
evaluation 
 
Model 1 reflects the case where Clusters did not set up accreditation procedure. This case is 
less  frequent,  but  it  happens  in  some  "small"  Clusters  which  encounter  difficulties  of 
mobilizing  the  actors  so  that  they  present  a  joint  project.  We  qualified  it  as  "automatic" 
because while simplifying, it is enough to form part of the cluster to obtain the label. 
If this simple model makes it possible to identify the projects belonging to the ‘Clusters', 
these  latter  are  absolutely  not  evaluated.  The  cluster  cannot  have  strategic  action  on  the 
projects it recognizes. As for the ANR, it will give a complementary fund to projects for the 
only credit that its members are located in Competitiveness cluster, without guarantee that this 
project contributes not only to some actors but also to the development of the cluster. 
It then helps the ANR in these aids to Clusters. We can say that this model is complementary 
to ANR actions, even if it is not satisfactory in terms of evaluation.  
3.2.2. Socio-economic criteria, a happy medium for strategic evaluation 
Model  2  gathers  accreditation  procedures  which  criteria  are  built  upon  the  cluster 
development  objectives.  The  cluster  evaluates  the  project’s  contribution  to  its  strategy  of 
development. The project must be co-operative to create synergies and be based if possible on 
former agreements. Such a condition increases in theory the chances of success because the 
actors already trust each other, which is an indispensable condition for co-operation (Dupuy   25 
and Torre, 2000). The project must have locally economic outcomes but also contribute to the 
internationalization of the cluster while making it more visible. Lastly, it must fall under the 
technological objectives of the cluster to contribute to its global development, in a definite 
speciality.  
For us, the interest of this model is that it proposes a clear division of labour. On the one 
hand, the governance sets up criteria that meet the Clusters’ needs. On the other hand, the 
ANR carries out the scientific evaluation of the projects. It finances the selected projects, 
whose  socio-economic  criteria  answer  the  needs  and  requirements  of  the  Clusters.  If  the 
evaluation carried out by the cluster is recognized for its quality, the projects accreditation 
and selection procedures done by the cluster and the ANR would offer a complementary 
approach, each one highlighting the different aspects of the projects. 
3.2.3. Multicriteria Certification, a risk of overlap between Clusters and 
ANR 
 
Model  3  evaluation  is  based  on  a  combination  of  the  evaluation  of  scientific  and 
organisational qualities of the project, and its conformity to the objectives of the Cluster. An 
accredited project presents a strong probability of success because many questions inherent to 
the co-operations were already considered. This model proposes then a complete evaluation 
of the projects. 
Model 3 is ambiguous because it helps to identify projects of excellent quality but with a 
potential risk of evaluation duplication. Indeed, being given its missions and instruments, the 
ANR will have to make its own scientific and financial evaluation, even if the one of the 
cluster would be of quality. We then conclude that the model 3 and the ANR procedures 
overlap.  
In addition to this first risk, we question the interest for the Clusters to carry out such a 
precise scientific and financial evaluation before applying for financings. Furthermore, this   26 
evaluation  is  very  costly  for  the  governance  structures,  which  generally  lack  human  and 
financial  means.  Some  Clusters  pay  their  expertises  to  ensure  the  quality.  It  can  also  be 
difficult to find available experts and to mobilise them. Indeed, in very specific fields, an 
expert could be solicited for the same project by both the Cluster and one of the agencies. The 
problem of the redundancy and quality of the work might occur, as well as the lassitude of the 
experts.  
 
These three models illustrate the difficulty to deal homogeneously with locally organised 
procedures.  Indeed,  if  the  socio-economic  accreditation  process  offers  a  complementary 
approach with the ANR selection process, the multicriteria model present some overlap with 
the ANR selection process, as they both evaluate the scientific quality of the project. This 
questions the efficiency of the complementary fund procedures, as different projects, certified 
with different procedures, can receive the same aid. Further coordination work should think 
about mechanisms to enhance efficient interactions. For example, the ANR could decide to 
use the Cluster accreditation report in its selection process.  
There  is  an  obvious  need  for  clarifying  the  role  of  the  accreditation  and  to  look  for  a 
coordination of the procedures, since a fair use of complementary fund is not possible as long 
as there is such diversity in the process.  
Conclusion 
This  paper  examined  the  setting  up  of  two  new  policy  instruments,  the  ANR  and  the 
Competitiveness  cluster,  in  the  context  of  the  French  reforms  for  a  new  organisation  of 
research and innovation. In particular, we wanted to focus on the nature of the interactions 
between these two instruments.   27 
This study shows that there is a lack of communication between the ANR and the governance 
structure of the Clusters. More dialogue and coordination would increase the efficiency of 
each of these instruments. Indeed, the instruments cannot be seen individually but integrated 
in a system. They would be more efficient if their function and means of action are clearly 
defined in coherence with the others.  
Our first recommendation consists of a clearer division of labour between the ANR and the 
competitiveness. Objectives of each actor should be explicit and understood. Subsequently, 
the different actors should define the information flows needed for working together. The 
recent  designation  of  ANR  corresponding  agents  for  the  cluster  could  improve  these 
communication flows.  
A better coordination would allow to reduce the duration of the selection process, by reducing 
the  time  frame  between  label  accreditation  and  project  selection.  A  recent  KPMG  study 
(2006) highlights that the duration of the selection process is an important factor for the 
success of Clusters policy and for firms’ involvement and dynamics.  
Our  second  recommendation  aims  at  building  a  common  language  and  vision  for  all  the 
actors. For instance, the ANR agents could participate to the elaboration of local projects 
guidelines. Actors seem also to require measures along this line, which is testified by their 
willingness for more joint work, including joint workshop on the label accreditation. 
 
We admit that our current observations cannot provide a rigorous evaluation of these reforms. 
We also admit that such an evaluation would not be relevant, since the reforms are just at the 
start. In particular, it is obvious that actors are currently learning by interacting with each 
other, and thereby developing new ways of working together. However, this descriptive case 
study aims at developing a policy-mix perspective, which can improve the understanding of 
the French innovation system as a whole.   28 
In order to enrich our findings, our research work will require to be expanded to the analysis 
of  interactions  between  new  instruments  and  old  instruments.  As  the  French  innovation 
system  is  building  new  instruments,  it  also  maintained  its  old  instruments.  In  particular, 
further work would need to examine the relations between the agencies and the mission-
oriented public research institutions, since there might be redundancies in the programming 
functions between these two levels. 
Furthermore we plan to frame this work in a more theoretical scope, to examine how the 
empirical evidences meet the new theories of public management. 
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